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Abstract 
The market for commercial properties is characterised by extreme heterogeneity in demand. In this paper, 
we aim to gain more insight in the heterogeneity in demand for employment agglomeration and size of the 
rental property using a two-stage hedonic approach following Bajari and Benkard (2005). We use unique 
micro-data of properties’ attributes as well as of firm characteristics. Given assumptions on the functional 
form of the production function, we identify firm-specific parameters using a nonparametric control function 
approach that corrects for endogeneity. The results show that agglomeration benefits are capitalised in 
rents: a one standard deviation increase in agglomeration leads to an increase in the annual rents of about 6 
percent. It is found that larger and business services firms are willing to pay (substantially) more for 
agglomeration. Furthermore, for office buildings a 10 percent increase in number of employees increases the 
marginal willingness to pay for floor space with 8 percent, which suggests that internal returns to scale are 
present. 
Keywords: Demand estimation; nonparametric estimation; hedonics; commercial properties. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists have generated an impressive number of studies on the demand for attributes of residential 
properties. In contrast, there is a lack of knowledge about the market for commercial properties, mainly 
because of insufficient data (Wheaton and Torto, 1994). However, commercial properties are an important 
input of production. For example for business services, the largest capital input component is the stock of 
buildings (Drennan and Kelly, 2010).  
The market for commercial properties is in some aspects fundamentally different from the market for 
residential housing. The market is far more heterogeneous in terms of supply and demand (Adair et al., 
1996). As an illustration, we observe that the coefficient of variation (CoV) for size (in square meters) for 
commercial properties is roughly five times higher than for residential properties.1 The large differences in 
physical attributes of commercial real estate are likely caused by extreme heterogeneity in demand. For 
example, a large manufacturing firm will have other building preferences than a small business services firm 
because of different production functions and, of course, different output levels. This type of extreme 
heterogeneity is not observed in the market for residential properties. 
In this paper, we aim to improve our understanding concerning heterogeneity in demand for size of 
commercial properties and for agglomeration of rental properties. The demand for agglomeration is relevant 
because firms that are located near others enforce agglomeration economies that are external to the firm. 
Agglomeration may benefit firms and so has an important role in firms’ location decisions due to labour 
market pooling, input sharing, knowledge spillovers, and a decrease in transportation costs (Marshall, 1920; 
Head et al., 1995; Henderson, 2002; DeBlasio and DiAddario, 2005). Rosenthal and Strange (2004) argue 
that wages, high productivity employment and rents reflect the presence of agglomeration economies, 
although very few studies use rents as a proxy for the existence of external economies (Drennan and Kelly, 
2010). Furthermore, urban economics usually focuses on the manufacturing sector when investigating the 
magnitude of extra-metropolitan agglomeration economies (Eberts and McMillen, 1999; Drennan and Kelly, 
                                                 
1 This example is based on commercial property data introduced later on and a representative sample of residential 
properties. 
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2010). In this paper we are able to compare the WTP for intra-metropolitan agglomeration across different 
industries using commercial rents. 
The demand for size of the rental property is of particular interest because of internal returns to scale in 
terms of employment (Coase, 1937; Tybout, 1993).2 For example, it has been shown that workers are more 
productive in larger services firms because of higher arrival rates of customers. In the goods-producing 
sector, larger firms are organised more efficiently in teams, establishing higher effort standards (Idson and 
Oi, 1999). As employment and size of the rental property are complementary in the production function, 
larger firms may be willing to pay more for an additional square meter than smaller firms.  
Theory suggests that the magnitude of both internal and external economies to scale is heavily dependent 
on firm characteristics (see e.g. Helpman et al., 2004). For example, business services firms are expected to 
experience more intense internal returns to workforce size than retailers. It also may be expected that there 
are major sectoral differences in the magnitude of agglomeration economies. It has been found for example 
that business services are willing to pay more for local agglomeration than manufacturing firms (Mun and 
Hutchinson, 1995; Dekle and Eaton, 1999). We focus on agglomeration based on employment, which is 
particularly important for sectors where inter-industry interactions are relevant (e.g. business services), but 
less so for other sectors (e.g. manufacturers). 
We employ a two-stage hedonic price approach introduced by Bajari and Benkard (2005). We use micro 
information on property attributes and firm characteristics avoiding the use of aggregate data, which 
complicates the estimation procedure (see Bajari and Kahn, 2008). In the first stage, we estimate a 
nonparametric hedonic price function of buildings’ attributes using nonparametric techniques that control 
for the endogeneity of agglomeration. This approach, advocated by Newey et al. (1999) and Blundell and 
Powell (2003), is not much applied yet in empirical literature. We combine this approach with insights of 
Robinson (1988). It involves the linearisation of a part of the function to be estimated, to reduce the curse of 
multidimensionality, common in nonparametric estimation. In the second stage, we regress firm-specific 
                                                 
2 In labour and industrial economics, workforce size plays an important role. For example, labour economists have 
shown that larger firms pay higher wages (Lester, 1967; Masters, 1969; Mellow, 1982; Brown and Medoff, 1989). 
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willingness to pay (WTP) parameters for these attributes on the firms’ sector and workforce size, which are 
arguably the most important property demand characteristics. Given assumptions on the functional form of 
the production function and the assumption that firms are profit maximisers, we show that the proposed 
procedure enables us to identify underlying production function parameters of firms. To our knowledge, this 
is the first study that is able to establish the relationship between firm characteristics and demand for 
attributes of real estate. Our approach is also more general in the sense that we do not concentrate on one 
specific type of building (e.g. offices) or one specific type of industry (e.g. manufacturing).  
This paper proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we outline the underlying theoretical model and 
describe our data. In Section 4 we pay attention to our nonparametric estimation procedure. In Section 5 we 
discuss the results. This is followed by a sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
2.1 Identification of hedonic price models 
Rosen (1974) developed a two-stage model where consumers maximise utility, which is a function of the 
property attributes and a composite good. In the first stage, the derivative of the property’s hedonic price 
function with respect to an attribute is computed, which represents the attribute’s implicit price. In the 
second stage, these implicit prices are regressed on the consumers’ demographic characteristics. However, 
there exists an identification problem, because consumers choose the hedonic price and the quantity of an 
attribute simultaneously. As a result, consumers with a stronger preference for a certain attribute will 
purchase properties that contain larger amounts of this attribute (Brown and Rosen, 1982; Bartik, 1987; 
Epple, 1987). Bartik (1987) proposes to use data from multiple markets, assuming that unobserved 
preferences do not vary across markets, while the hedonic function does. This should identify hedonic 
demand parameters. Ekeland et al. (2004) provide another solution to this identification problem for a 
product with only one observable attribute: when the hedonic price function is estimated nonparametrically, 
data on multiple markets is not required to identify preferences. Bajari and Benkard (2005) adapt this to a 
multi-attribute product and propose a two-stage procedure to identify consumer demand. The first stage is 
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estimated nonparametrically, which identifies individual-specific taste parameters.3 In the second stage, 
assuming a parametric form of the utility function, the taste parameters are regressed on consumers’ 
characteristics. 
We employ a similar procedure as proposed by Bajari and Benkard (2005) and, importantly, show that it 
can be applied to the market of commercial properties. Our approach requires some assumptions on the 
firms’ production function. We distinguish between building inputs (e.g. the size of the rental property) and 
non-building inputs (e.g. number of workers) in the production function. Using a bid rent methodology and 
assuming a competitive market with profit-maximising firms, we show that the proposed procedure enables 
one to identify firm-specific production function parameters related to building inputs.4 
 
2.2 A model for the commercial property market 
More formally, firms are assumed to maximise a profit function subject to a production function (see also 
Palmquist, 1988; Bollinger et al., 1998). Let  denote the profit of firm ,  is the price of output  ,  denotes 
the price vector of non-building inputs , where 	 
 1, … ,  and  
 1, … , .  equals the bid rent for 
a property , which depends on a vector of building inputs , where  
 1, … ,  and  
 1, … , . The 
production function  is a continuous function of building and non-building inputs. Hence, for each building 
, firm behaviour is characterised by maximising profits with respect to non-building inputs : 
max  
     . s.t.  
  , !.                  (1) 
Given prices  and , and building inputs , this maximisation problem solves for non-building input " 

 , , !. We assume a perfect competitive market, so  equals zero. Then: 
 ",   "   
 0.                    (2) 
So, equation (2) defines the bid rent of firm  for property .  In equilibrium, each property is rented to the 
firm with the highest bid rent, so equilibrium rent $ is defined by $ 
 max%&. To obtain the partial 
                                                 
3 The estimates are nonparametric in the sense that there is not a distribution imposed on the individual-specific taste 
parameters. 
4 The bid rent methodology is standard in the field of urban economics; see for example Fujita et al. (2001). 
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derivative of the equilibrium rent $ with respect to variable  , we take first derivatives and, using the 
envelope theorem, we arrive at the following condition: 
'()
'*+)

 ',-)'*+) 
 
'.-
'*+)
.                      (3) 
 This condition is intuitive, as  denotes revenue. So, it simply states that the marginal effect of a building 
input on the rent is equal to its marginal effect on the revenue function (the production function multiplied 
with the output price). To identify parameters of the production function, we normalise price  to 1. 
As we have only one observation per firm, we cannot learn a firm’s production function without making 
additional assumptions on the functional form. To identify firm-specific production parameters, we assume a 
semi-logarithmic production function:5 
 
 ",  
 / " ! 0 ∑ 2 log ,                   (4) 
where the production is an arbitrary function /  · ! of non-building inputs, and 2 are structural parameters 
of the production function related to building inputs. We will allow that 2 
 2 " !, so these parameters 
may be a function of optimally chosen non-building inputs (e.g. workforce size).6 Applying the functional 
form assumption (4) yields: 
2 
 
'()
'*+)
.                       (5) 
Given an estimate of 7$ 7⁄  one may derive the firm-specific structural parameters 2 of the production 
function. 
  
                                                 
5 For convenience, we also assume continuous attributes  in this exposition. 
6 Note that our assumptions on the functional form of the production function are not so much restrictive. In case that 
2  is a constant, then the production function is additive in "  and log. However, it also allows for the possibility 
that / " ! 
 0 and it may be that "  and log interact via 2 . Without making any assumptions on the functional 
form of the production firm, we still are able to identify firm-specific marginal willingness to pay, which is equal 
to 7$ 7⁄ , but not any structural parameters of the production function. 
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3. Data 
3.1 Datasets 
We make use of two datasets. The first consists of transactions of commercial properties provided by real 
estate agents between 2001 and 2007 in the NUTS3-region Zuid-Holland, located in the west of the 
Netherlands. This region includes Rotterdam, the second largest city of the Netherlands, and The Hague, 
where the national government is located, but also cities such as Leiden and Gouda. This region covers about 
20 percent of national economic activity. The dataset contains information about annual rent (or purchase 
price) and the buildings’ attributes, such as address, size (gross floor area in square meters), type of the 
building (e.g. shop, office), number of parking spaces, year of construction and last renovation. It also 
contains information about the sector in which the firm, that occupies the building, operates.7  
We select rent transactions, which cover about 80 percent of the observations, and exclude observations 
which do not provide information about the building’s size or rent, or which refer to properties smaller than 
100 square meter, larger than 7,500 square meter or with yearly rents above 275,000 euro.8 When firms 
rent a part of a building, the rent and building attributes of the transaction refer to the rental property (the 
rented part of the building). Our second dataset contains information about characteristics of all 
establishments in the Zuid-Holland region in 2005. This information comes from administrative sources and 
is very reliable, as Dutch firms are obliged by law to provide this information. We have information on the 
establishment’s exact location, sector and number of employees. In the remainder of this paper, we label 
establishments as firms and usually refer to rents as prices. 
For our two-stage estimation procedure, discussed later on, one has to match property and firm data. We 
match the information on firms with the information on property transactions using address and sectoral 
information. To minimise the probability that the firm is a holding company that does not occupy the 
                                                 
7 Sector information is not always reliable and is missing in 15 percent of the cases, probably because real estate agents 
do not consider this variable as essential, as it is not used by them for commercial purposes. This information will be 
helpful to match the two datasets, but is not used otherwise. 
8 We have obtained data from PropertyNL, a publisher that collects data on transactions that usually refer to properties 
that exceed 100m2. The chosen maximum rent (275,000) is about two standard deviations above the mean rent. We 
have compared the medians of the attributes before and after the selections. They are similar except, of course, for size 
(because we select properties larger than 100 square meters). So, the selected sample appears to be a representative 
selection of the whole sample. 
8 
 
building, we select firms that have at least two employees, because single-employee firms seldom occupy a 
building larger than 100 square meter. When there is only one firm at an address, the match is based on 
addresses. When there are several firms located at one address, we match using sector information as well. 
When there is no exact match (30 percent of the data), we weight observations of firms using the proportion 
of firms located at one address.9 Because we use weights (based on individual observations), rather than 
taking averages, the second stage estimates are consistent (and more efficient than without weighting). Note 
that we match firm data from 2005 with building transaction data from 2001-2007. So, we implicitly assume 
that, when a firm moves out of a property, there is a high positive correlation between the firm’s 
characteristics and those of the new firm that will occupy the property. However, if the latter does not hold, 
the matching procedure just implies that for some observations we randomly match firms and properties. 
This does not affect the consistency of the second stage estimates. Property observations without a match 
are used in the first stage but not in the second stage.10 In the first stage we estimate a nonparametric 
hedonic price function based on 3,595 observations. In the second stage, we use 1,366 property 
observations that are matched to 2,431 observations of firms. 
 
3.2 Description of data 
We are interested in the willingness to pay for size of the rental property and employment agglomeration, 
controlling for other building and environmental attributes. We use the number of parking spaces, distance 
to the nearest railway station, dummy indicators whether a property is within 1200 meter of a railway 
station, within 150 meter of highways, railways and rivers, year of last renovation/construction, and 
whether the property already exists, or has to be constructed. For descriptives of our data we refer to 
Appendix A. On average, the yearly rent is about € 70,000, the transacted size is 635 square meters and the 
average rent per square meter is about € 150. However, there is a large difference between the average size 
of different building types (industrial buildings, offices and shops). Industrial buildings are on average 1,000 
                                                 
9 For example, if there are two firms on the same address, then we use two weights of 0.5 each. 
10 Alternatively, in the first stage one may use only the property observations that are matched to firms’ observations. 
The results based on this sample are similar. We prefer the results presented in the current paper as the number of 
observations is larger, resulting in more reliable estimates. 
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square meters, offices 500 square meters and shops 300 square meters. For each property we compute a so-
called employment agglomeration potential, following scholars such as Lucas (2001) and Lucas and Rossi-
Hansberg (2002), who argue that workers are more productive when they are employed in the vicinity of 
other workers. Agglomeration is measured by a weighted average of the number of jobs located in the 
neighbourhood of the property using an exponential distance decay function, which is continuous over 
space. 11 Formally: 
9 ℓ;! 
 < = >?@Aℓ,ℓ;B ℓ!Cℓ, Dℓ                    (6) 
where 9ℓ; denotes agglomeration of location
 
ℓ;, B ℓ! is the number of jobs of location ℓ, Cℓ, ℓ; denotes the 
distance in kilometres between ℓ and ℓ;, and < is a decay coefficient. We set < is equal to one, implying that 
most of the weight of this agglomeration potential is within a few kilometres from the buildings’ location.12 
We present a map of the pattern of agglomeration in Appendix A. It clearly reveals the locations of 
Rotterdam and The Hague, the main employment centres where almost 45 percent of the commercial 
properties are transacted.  
As argued by Bayer and Timmins (2007), location decisions alone are insufficient in distinguishing the 
potential of local spillovers from those of local locational advantages. As a result, any positive effect of 
agglomeration is likely to be overstated (Ellison and Glaeser, 1999; Bayer and Timmins, 2007). We therefore 
need an instrument which is correlated with agglomeration but uncorrelated with any unobserved 
locational advantage. We use population density of municipalities in 1830 as an instrument for 
agglomeration. Note that municipalities in 1830 were much smaller and do not overlap with the current 
ones. Zuid-Holland, the region which our data refer to, consisted in 1830 of 267 municipalities, whereas 
nowadays it consists of only 77 municipalities. The instrument’s validity rests on the assumption that 
population density in 1830 is unrelated to current locational advantages (and therefore profit of firms), but 
has a causal effect on the current agglomeration pattern (see also Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Rice et al., 2006; 
                                                 
11 We focus on urbanisation economies, which instead of sector-specific localisation economies, relate to positive 
externalities of diversity (Henderson, 1986; Glaeser et al., 1992).  
12 In the sensitivity analysis, we will also employ other values of <. 
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Combes et al., 2008). This instrument is strong as population density is strongly autocorrelated and 
(current) population and employment densities are positively correlated (McMillen and McDonald, 1998).13 
 
4. Estimation procedure 
4.1 First stage estimation procedure 
We estimate the implicit prices faced by firm  that occupies property , consisting of  attributes. We 
suppose that rent $ is some nonparametric function E  · ! of employment agglomeration, size of the rental 
property and a number of control variables. We interact size with building type because the unobserved 
quality of an additional square meter is highly correlated with building type.14 For example, office space 
refers to a much higher quality building, in particularly internally, whereas shops and industrial buildings 
are usually bare. To control for unobserved heterogeneity we add transaction year dummies F and 
municipality dummies G to our specification, where F 
 1, … , H and G 
 1, … , I. To reduce the number of 
nonparametric parameters in the function to be estimated, we assume that the latter dummies are linearly 
related to the rent. This reduces the curse of multidimensionality, a limitation of nonparametric applications 
(Yatchew, 2003). We then have the following rent function: 
$ 
 EJKKL, G> M//>, G> GNM, G> BCO, MBFPMLG 0 ∑ QRDR 	SBJLF CS		R, 
0 ∑ TUDU >JP CS		U 0 V,                      7! 
where V denotes the property-specific error term. We employ an estimation approach proposed by Fan and 
Gijbels (1996).  E  · ! is then estimated using locally weighted regression. Local methods have a lower 
asymptotic bias than the Nadaraya-Watson estimator and a lower asymptotic variance than the Gasser-
Müller estimator, but more importantly, have been shown to generate more plausible estimates of implicit 
prices (Bajari and Kahn, 2005; 2008). For each observation X̃ we run a locally weighted regression, 
                                                 
13 Following Ciccone and Hall (1996), we also examined an instrument that captures the distance to the nearest station 
in 1900. Railway stations were an important factor enforcing agglomeration of firms and people in 1900. However, it 
appears that this instrument is weak, so we do not use it in the present analysis. 
14 Note that some sectors occupy one type of building. For example, the government occupies offices in 95 percent of 
the cases. Equivalently, different types of buildings are predominantly occupied by one sector: about 70 percent of 
industrial buildings are rented by manufacturing, logistic or wholesale firms, 50 percent of offices are rented by 
business or other services firms and about 70 percent of the shops are rented by retailers, restaurants or bars. 
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where 1 Z X̃ Z  . So, more informally, local linear regressions assign greater importance to observations 
with attributes that are similar to X̃. A kernel is employed which is a product of standard normal 
distributions based on differences between attributes that are nonlinearly related to the rent. We then 
assume that the hedonic price function locally satisfies: 
$ 
 [\ 0 [] logJKKLM	>PJFMB 0 [^ logG> M//> 0 [_ logG> GNM 0 [`  logG> BCO. 
0 ∑ [abc MBFPMLG 0 ∑ QRDR 	SBJLF CS		>GG 0 ∑ TUDU >JP CS		>GU 0 V ,            (8) 
where [, QR, TU are coefficients to be estimated.   
There are three main issues in our set-up which complicate the estimation procedure. We therefore adopt 
a two-step estimation procedure which overcomes these issues. The first issue is that we have to determine 
the bandwidth of our kernel. A lower bandwidth leads to a lower mean-squared error, but to higher variance 
of the estimator. A larger bandwidth may create a larger bias when the underlying function is nonlinear (Fan 
and Gijbels, 1996). In the current context, it is less relevant to reduce the variance of the local estimator, as 
the estimated coefficients will be used as the dependent variable in the second stage. According to theory, a 
small bandwidth and therefore a high variance of the local estimator only results in additional random 
'measurement' error of the dependent variable in the second stage (Yatchew, 2003). This does not create any 
inconsistency in the second-stage coefficients. In contrast, any bias in the estimates of the first stage due to 
oversmoothing (too high values of the bandwidth) will induce a bias towards zero in the second-stage 
coefficients because the 'measurement' error is not independent of the explanatory variables. Using these 
considerations, we employ a bandwidth of 2. Lower bandwidths lead to nearly singular weight matrices for a 
number of observations, which in turn lead to unreliable estimates.15 
Second, as already noted, to reduce the curse of dimensionality we linearise some part of the hedonic 
price function. We employ the framework of Robinson (1988), who proposes a procedure that leads to √B-
                                                 
15 Conventional bandwidth selection methods, such as minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion, Generalised Cross 
Validation (see Hurvich et al., 1998) and the T-value of Rice (1984) lead to oversmoothing and less variation in the 
coefficients, whereas Silverman’s rule of thumb and the Zheng rule lead to undersmoothing and unreliable estimates 
(see Silverman, 1986, Bishop and Timmins, 2008). Our bandwidth is more or less in between. In the sensitivity analysis, 
we will show that our results are rather robust to changes in the bandwidth. 
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consistent estimates for the linearly related variables.16 Robinson (1988) demonstrates that the coefficients 
may be estimated at parametric rates of convergence, which make them rather efficient. 
A third issue is the endogeneity of agglomeration. To account for this, we employ a control function 
approach (see Blundell and Powell, 2003; Yatchew, 2003). This approach treats endogeneity as an omitted 
variable problem, comparable to Heckman’s correction for selectivity bias, through the introduction of an 
appropriately estimated control function (Heckman, 1979). An important restrictive assumption of the 
control function approach is that the endogenous variable should be continuously distributed, which is 
fulfilled in our application. Given the use of local linear models, this approach is preferred to two main 
alternative approaches to correct for endogeneity such as IV and plugging in fitted values (Blundell and 
Powell, 2003).17 The procedure to apply the control function is to first regress the endogenous independent 
variable on all independent variables and instruments. The predicted errors of this step are used as a 
nonparametric control function which is additive to the dependent variable in the second step. This solves 
the inconsistency of standard nonparametric estimation (Newey et al., 1999; Pinkse and Ng, 2007). We 
employ a series approximation of the nonparametric function of the first stage errors. The main advantage is 
that one can apply the semiparametric estimation procedure of Robinson (1988). Otherwise, very 
computational intensive procedures such as backfitting or additive separable nonparametric least squares 
have to be employed (see Yatchew, 2003, pp. 102-103). 
We refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of the full estimation procedure of the first stage. 
 
  
                                                 
16 To correct for unobserved spatial heterogeneity, Bajari and Kahn (2008) first run a standard linear regression with 
zip code fixed effects. The zip code fixed effects are then subtracted from the rent. This procedure does only lead to √B 
estimates if the linear model is the true model, so we slightly improve on this procedure.  
17 Note that in linear models, the control function approach, instrumental variables, and plugging in fitted values in the 
second stage will lead to the same results. This is not the case in nonlinear and nonparametric models. Furthermore, 
Newey and Powell (2003) propose a nonparametric two-step least squares estimator (NP2SLS), which is applicable to 
series approximation (such as polynomials) but not to local linear methods, as we use in our work. As is well known, 
the intuitive approach to plug fitted values of the first stage into the second stage leads to inconsistent estimates of 
nonlinear and nonparametric parameters (Ameniya, 1974; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
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4.2 Second stage estimation procedure 
In the second stage, we identify the coefficients of the production function (defined by (4)) and are able to 
identify the structural WTP of a firm: i.e. these parameters hold at any point away from its observed 
building/location choice, by assuming the following functional form: 
 
 ",  
 2] logJKKL 0 2^ logG> M//> 0 2_ logG> GNM 0 2` logG> BCO. 
0 ∑ 2
5 MBFPMLG 0 / " !.                  (9) 
Given (9) we are able to recover the structural parameters 2, because (5) and (8) imply that 2f 
 [g. The 
equality of these two types of coefficients is due to functional form assumptions. Given other functional form 
assumptions, the relationship between these two types of coefficients will be more complicated. For 
example, when one locally assumes a double-log hedonic price function, it can be shown that 2f 
 [g$. 
So, in essence the estimation procedure allows for an estimation of firm’s  structural willingness to pay 
for attribute . For the attribute agglomeration we report the willingness to pay for a standard deviation 
increase from the mean: 2fhiij," 
 2fhiij, log 32726.14!  log  17618.86!!.18 For the attribute size, we 
report the willingness to pay for a one unit increase from the mean (in square meter). This is computed as 
2fR*qrsstq," 
 2fR*qrsstq, log 503.41!  log  502.41!!, 2fR*qRurv," 
 2fR*qRurv, log 315.09!  log  314.09!! 
and 2fR*qxAy," 
 2fR*qxAy, log 1013.45!  log  1012.45!!. The estimation procedure allows us to examine 
whether 2f"  varies systematically with characteristics of firms, in particular, whether they depend on the 
firms’ employment and the type of sector. These sector dummies capture many characteristics of the firm, 
not explicitly included, such as the input of capital. Then: 
2f" 
 2f"  " ! 
 ] 0 ^ log >	LM	>BF G>! 0 ∑ zG>FMPz 0z { .            (10) 
where  are parameters to be estimated and { denotes an error term.19  
                                                 
18 Note that the mean of the agglomeration potential is 17618.86 and the standard deviation 15107.28, see Table A1 in 
Appendix A. 
19 It is assumed that employment size and industry are exogenous. One may however argue that the size of the 
workforce of a firm is endogenous. For example, firms that for unobserved reasons prefer larger more prestigious 
buildings may hire more workers. However, these endogenous changes in workforce size should be minimal compared 
to the large differences in workforce size. For agglomeration, one may argue that firms which have for unobserved 
reasons a strong preference for agglomeration may hire fewer workers, because wages tend to be higher in 
agglomerated areas (Wheaton and Lewis, 2001). However, we include municipality fixed effects that control for this. 
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5. Results and discussion 
5.1 First stage results 
We first pay attention to the mean values of the willingness to pay. In Table 1 we compare the estimation 
results of a nonparametric regression with the control function approach, as discussed above, with three 
other approaches: a standard OLS, instrumental variables regression and a nonparametric regression 
without a control function. In Figures 1-4 the distributions of the coefficients of agglomeration and size of 
the rental property are presented. They indicate for example that heterogeneity in the WTP for 
agglomeration is relatively large compared to the WTP for a square meter. 
 
Table 1: Estimates of Marginal WTP for continuous attributes 
 Parametric regression Nonparametric regression 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Instrumental Variables 
Without Control 
Function 
With Control 
Function 
 Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Mean Pref. CoV Mean Pref. CoV 
Agglomeration 3689.43 (823.86) *** 3708.02 (1264.85) *** 3261.32 0.67 2765.62 0.81 
Size in m2, Office 128.06 (3.73) *** 128.06 (3.73) *** 120.86 0.08 120.58 0.08 
Size in m2, Shops 126.89 (5.81) *** 126.89 (5.86) *** 116.83 0.11 117.00 0.11 
Size in m2, Ind. Building 44.69 (1.61) *** 44.69 (1.61) *** 42.67 0.15 42.67 0.15 
           
Number of observations 3595 3595 3595 3595 
R-squared 0.6998    
NOTES: The dependent variable is the yearly rent. Standard errors (parametric regressions) are between parentheses and 
are clustered on municipality level. Coefficients are significant at *0.10, **0.05 and ***0.01 levels. We test in the parametric 
model whether the instrument (population density) is strong. It appears that the instrument is strong and has an F-value of 
958.95.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of WTP for agglomeration          Figure 2: Distribution of WTP for office size 
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Figure 3: Distribution of WTP for shop size                  Figure 4: Distribution of WTP for size in an industrial bldng 
 
5.1.1 Agglomeration 
In Table 1 we see that the four different estimation procedures indicate that the average marginal WTP for a 
standard deviation increase in agglomeration ranges from € 2765 to € 3708. The coefficients of the 
parametric regressions are similar to the mean preferences of the nonparametric regressions. This increases 
our confidence in the estimation procedure, as Bayer et al. (2007) argue that standard hedonic price 
regressions should reflect mean preferences for attributes that vary continuously over space. Melo et al. 
(2009) suggest that instrumenting agglomeration will not lead to a substantial change in estimates, which is 
confirmed by our IV-estimates. Nevertheless, as is suggested by Bayer and Timmins (2007), non-
instrumented estimates of agglomeration are usually overstated: indeed, the estimates of the mean 
preferences using a nonparametric control function approach are about 15 percent lower. The coefficient of 
variation reveals that there is much more heterogeneity in the demand for agglomeration than in the 
demand for size of the rental property. This makes sense because some industries experience more 
agglomeration economies than other industries, and are therefore willing to pay more for agglomeration. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of 2fhiij," . The willingness to pay for one standard deviation increase in 
employment agglomeration is almost always positive  and less than € 6000. Only 3 percent of the WTP-
parameters for agglomeration are negative.20 To get an idea of the magnitude of the agglomeration effect, 
consider a firm on a location with an average agglomeration potential of about 17,000. When an additional 
                                                 
20 An example of a negative agglomeration effect is the increased competitiveness when firms cluster together. 
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firm with 250 employees locates at 100 meter distance of the firm, the firm’s average willingness to pay for 
this increase in agglomeration is € 57 on a yearly basis, about 0.1 percent of the yearly rent.21 When the 
additional firm is ten times larger (e.g. the size of a headquarter of a multinational), the WTP is € 540, about 
1 percent of the yearly rent. Firms located in non-urban areas, say a location with an agglomeration potential 
of 2500, value additional agglomeration more. The WTP for an additional firm with 250 employees located 
at 100 meter distance is then about € 387. These findings are consistent with the notion that agglomeration 
benefits are capitalised into higher prices. 
 
5.1.2 Size of the rental property 
We find that the annual marginal willingness to pay for an additional square meter from the mean is 
between € 35 and € 170 with an average of € 140, see Figures 2, 3 and 4. Industrial buildings are on average 
much larger, the WTP for a one meter increase from the mean is much lower than for example an additional 
meter in a shop, because of our semi-log specification. When we consider the WTP for a one meter increase 
of a building of the same size, let’s say an average building, the WTP for offices, shops and industrial 
buildings are respectively € 100, € 63 and € 72. We now see that office space indeed implies higher quality, 
because the WTP is much higher than for example shop space. Figures 2, 3 and 4 reveal that the willingness 
to pay for size is almost always positive, a feature that is not imposed.  
 
5.2 Second stage results 
5.2.1 Agglomeration 
The results of the second stage estimates are presented in Table 2. We have defined agglomeration in such a 
way (see (1)) that we identify the willingness to pay for employment agglomeration within a couple of 
kilometres of each firm. We first note that there is a significant positive effect of firm size on the WTP for 
agglomeration: a 10 percent increase in workforce size leads to an increase in the WTP for agglomeration of 
about € 950, about 2 percent of the annual rent.  
                                                 
21 Using (5) and (6): 2f |log}17618.86 0  250>?0.1!~  log 17618.86!. 
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Table 2: Estimates of Marginal WTP for attributes 
 
Agglomeration 
Size in m2   
Office 
Size in m2  
Shop 
Size in m2  
Industrial Building 
Employment (log) 95.23 (43.84) ** 1.22 (0.19) *** -0.30 (0.29)  0.38 (0.11) *** 
Transport 31.87 (274.86)  4.37 (1.33) ***    0.71 (0.69)  
Wholesale 23.54 (213.16)  1.17 (0.53) ** -4.63 (0.89) *** 0.65 (0.24) *** 
Retail 374.42 (153.31) ** 0.22 (0.54)  3.76 (1.03) *** -1.82 (0.34) *** 
Hotel & Recreation -198.95 (298.90)  0.36 (1.07)  1.33 (2.08)     
Business Services 1047.82 (153.07) *** 5.95 (0.53) *** -2.30 (0.99) ** -2.53 (0.38) *** 
Other Services 788.56 (173.27) *** 2.95 (0.78) ***    -2.75 (0.52) *** 
Government 746.01 (686.58)  14.83 (2.64) ***       
Education 1297.49 (263.74) *** 3.39 (1.72) **       
Healthcare 911.74 (240.59) *** 7.77 (1.44) ***    -0.54 (0.60)  
Other 616.44 (302.96) ** 5.54 (2.60) **       
Constant 1992.43 (170.15) *** 114.35 (0.61) *** 119.05 (1.04) *** 42.87 (0.33) *** 
             
Number of observations 2431 2431 1787 2255 
R-squared 0.0568 0.1551 0.0633 0.0648 
NOTES: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. Coefficients are significant at *0.10, **0.05 and ***0.01 levels. The 
manufacturing sector is the omitted category. The WTP for agglomeration refers to a standard deviation increase from the 
mean. We exclude observations of sectors which almost always occupy one specific type of building. 
 
So, when the workforce size increases, the WTP for agglomeration increases less than proportional. This 
suggests that for larger firms agglomeration economies are relatively less important, probably because a 
large firm is more adept at exploiting knowledge created in the own establishment (Audretsch, 1998). 
It appears that there is a substantial difference in the WTP for agglomeration between the Services and 
Manufacturing sector (the reference category in Table 2), which is also found by Mun and Hutchinson (1995) 
and Dekle and Eaton (1999). Business services are willing to pay € 1047 more for a one standard deviation 
increase in agglomeration than manufacturers. This effect also holds for Other Services. Retailers are willing 
to pay more for agglomeration than manufacturers, probably because there may exist localisation economies 
by allowing customers to go a shop nearby (Eberts and McMillen, 1999). We also establish that the 
educational sector is willing to pay € 1300 more for agglomeration than the manufacturing sector. In our 
sample, the educational sector refers predominantly to private firms. 22 For these firms customers are 
usually workers from other companies that take off-the-job trainings. Proximity to other companies may 
therefore beneficial, because it implies increased accessibility to potential customers. Another explanation 
                                                 
22 Public firms, such as universities and schools for higher vocational training, generally do not rent buildings, but 
purchase properties, which are not included in our sample. 
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may be that proximity to other companies may lead to more intense ties with labour markets, which can be 
beneficial for students in their search for jobs. 
 
5.2.2 Size of the rental property 
In Table 2, we see that there is a substantial employment effect on the WTP for an additional square meter in 
an office. Larger firms are willing to pay more for additional office space than smaller firms: 10 percent 
increase in workforce size leads to an increase in WTP for a square meter of € 12.20. Consider a firm with 30 
employees and a slightly smaller firm with 25 employees. For an average office building, the larger firm is 
then willing to pay € 0.22 more for an additional square meter than the smaller firm, in line with the idea 
that there are internal returns to workforce size which makes it profitable to operate larger establishments 
(Coase, 1937; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Tybout, 1993). This result also holds for additional floor space 
in industrial buildings, but then the effect is somewhat smaller. 
There are also some notable sector-specific differences in the WTP for size of the rental property. 
Interestingly, the government sector is willing to pay more for office space than the private sector. For 
example, it is willing to pay € 14.83 more per square meter than a manufacturer. An explanation is that 
(local) governments are less flexible in their location choice. For example, the local governments of 
Rotterdam have to locate in the relatively expensive municipality of Rotterdam and cannot locate elsewhere 
forcing them to outbid other firms on these locations. Another explanation is that the government does not 
strive for profit maximisation or cost minimisation, so a less efficient policy regarding the use of buildings is 
adopted and, it may happen that civil servants receive larger offices than employees in the private sector. 
Retailers are willing to pay € 8.39 more for shop space than wholesalers, probably because retailers usually 
locate in shops, while wholesalers also locate in industrial buildings.  
Retailers also may have a higher turnover per square meter than wholesalers. The manufacturing, 
transport and wholesale sectors are willing to pay more for an additional square meter in an industrial 
building than any other sector. Overall, the average willingness to pay for an additional meter of a specific 
type of building strongly depends on sector.  
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We also include interactions of sector and employment size, presented in Appendix C, to verify whether 
the effects of an increased workforce vary over different sectors. These results indicate that business 
services experience internal returns to scale in offices: a one percent increase in workforce size increases the 
WTP for size with € 1.87. Manufacturers and wholesalers that occupy offices also experience internal 
returns to scale. In industrial buildings, only wholesalers experience statistically significant internal returns 
to scale. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section we will demonstrate that our results are robust to weighting in the second stage, changes in 
bandwidth, excluding extreme values in the second stage, exclusion of fixed effects, other values for the 
decay coefficient <, and the functional form of the hedonic price function. We already showed in Table 1 that 
the results for agglomeration are not very sensitive to its instrumentation. 
First, recall that we used weighting in the second stage for 30 percent of the building observations, as it is 
unknown for these observations which specific firm occupies a certain building. When we exclude these 
observations, it appears that the standard errors are somewhat larger but the results are (almost) identical.  
Second, Bajari and Kahn (2005) argue that the choice of bandwidth of the kernel is important as it 
determines the smoothness of the function to be estimated. Our reference bandwidth is two. We also tried 
bandwidths of 1.5 and 2.5. In Table 3 we observe that the mean preferences are about the same. The 
coefficient of variation is somewhat larger for lower bandwidths, implying larger effects in the second stage. 
Indeed, the coefficients are respectively about 50 percent larger and 35 percent smaller, when bandwidths 
of 1.5 and 2.5 are employed. Nevertheless, the signs of the coefficients remain the same. 
Third, we checked whether excluding WTP-estimates that are more than three standard deviations away 
from the mean of the WTP-parameters affect our results. The mean preferences remain unaffected (Table 3). 
It appears that the second stage coefficients are very similar, although the exclusion of extreme values leads 
to estimates that are closer to zero in the second stage (about 10 percent, see Table C2 in Appendix C).  
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Table 3: Summary of sensitivity analysis     
 Nonparametric regression   
 
Bandwidth=1.5 Bandwidth=2.5 
Excluding 
extreme values  
No Fixed 
Effects 
Double log 
hedonic 
 Mean Pref. CoV Mean Pref. CoV Mean. Pref. CoV Mean. Pref. CoV Mean. Pref. CoV 
Agglomeration 2826.34 1.63 2859.89 0.30 2805.82 0.52 4203.5 0.54 1209.61 1.08 
Size in m2, Office 117.23 0.15 122.23 0.05 119.99 0.06 120.70 0.08 109.83 0.71 
Size in m2, Shops 109.23 0.28 120.28 0.07 116.00 0.08 116.97 0.11 94.91 0.73 
Size in m2, Ind. Building 40.66 0.28 43.59 0.05 43.13 0.08 42.87 0.16 19.41 0.74 
 
        
Number of observations 3595 3595 3595 3595 3595 
 
Fourth, we have examined whether excluding municipality fixed effects generate other results. It appears 
that the results for size of the rental property are identical. However, the average willingness to pay for 
agglomeration is substantially higher (about 50 percent), indicating that municipality specific, but 
unobserved factors, are correlated with agglomeration. Examples come into mind are the presence of a large 
harbour (Rotterdam), the presence of national government buildings (The Hague), and universities (Delft, 
Leiden). 
Fifth, the value of the agglomeration potential is dependent on a decay coefficient <. As already noted, 
most of the weight of this agglomeration potential is then within a few kilometres from the property’s 
location. The higher the value of <, the more localised this potential is. The mean WTP for agglomeration 
appears to be insensitive with regard to < (see Table C3 in Appendix C). The second stage results also hardly 
change. For example, it is still found that for business services are willing to pay more for agglomeration 
than manufacturers, but the effect is somewhat smaller, about € 400. One important exception is that for 
large values of <, the employment effect changes sign: one percent increase in workforce size leads to a 
decrease in the WTP for agglomeration of € 177. Apparently, for very local agglomeration smaller firms are 
more efficient in capturing agglomeration economies. 
Finally, in (8) we assumed a local semi-log hedonic price function. We have examined whether a double-
log hedonic price function leads to substantially different results. The mean preference of agglomeration is € 
1200, which is about the half of our semi-log estimates (see Table 3). Also the mean preferences of size of the 
rental property are somewhat lower. When we regress elasticities of agglomeration and size of the rental 
property on workforce size and sector, the main results discussed above still hold. So, the approach 
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introduced by Bajari and Benkard (2005) is quite robust to the specification of the hedonic price function. As 
elasticities do not directly reveal parameters of the production function, we prefer estimates produced by 
the semi-log hedonic price function. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The market for commercial property is characterised by extreme heterogeneity in demand and therefore in 
supply of properties. In the current paper, we estimated the firms’ demand for agglomeration and size of the 
rental property. On the one hand, firms may want to be located near others, leading to returns external to 
the firm. On the other hand, occupying larger properties may lead to increasing returns to scale in terms of 
workforce size. We employ a two-stage estimation method proposed by Bajari and Benkard (2005) and 
applied by Bajari and Kahn (2005). Given assumptions on the production function, we identify firm-specific 
parameters related to building inputs.  Nonparametric methods that control for the endogeneity of 
agglomeration are employed, proposed by Newey et al. (1999) and Blundell and Powell (2003). 
We showed that the agglomeration potential is positively related to rents, revealing the presence of 
external economies. Our results also indicate that there are substantial differences in firms’ willingness to 
pay for agglomeration. Manufacturing firms are for example willing to pay substantially less for 
agglomeration than business services firms, retailers and firms in the educational sector. We were also able 
to show that larger firms are willing to pay more for space, suggesting internal returns to scale. A 10 percent 
increase in number of employees increases the marginal willingness to pay for a square meter of offices with 
about 8 percent per year. These returns are especially strong in the business services and manufacturing 
sector. 
The results contribute to our understanding of spatial patterns (for example: labour-extensive 
manufacturing firms are often clustered on remote industrial sites; business services firms have more 
employees and are located in city centres near other employment). However, more research is needed to 
corroborate these results and provide more evidence on the magnitude and nature of differences in firms’ 
preferences. 
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Appendix A: Descriptives 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the first stage variables 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
Dependent variable   
Price per year in € 68635.10 48508.51 
Variables of interest   
Size in m2 637.15 713.44 
Size in m2, Office 502.41 353.8422 
Size in m2, Shops 314.09 220.6823 
Size in m2, Ind. Building 1012.45 714.4944 
Agglomeration (< 
 1) 17618.86 15107.28 
Agglomeration (< 
 0.5) 22171.86 14542.90 
Agglomeration (< 
 2.5) 17615.62 15095.58 
Agglomeration (< 
 5) 12035.95 12609.22 
Agglomeration (< 
 10) 8472.62 9377.56 
Control variables   
Office (dummy) 0.43 0.49 
Shop (dummy) 0.23 0.42 
Industrial building (dummy) 0.35 0.48 
Parking spaces a 28.96 63.67 
Data on parking spaces missing (dummy) 0.64 0.48 
Distance to station (within 1200m) 0.30 0.39 
Station < 1200m (dummy) 0.43 0.50 
Highway <150m (dummy) 0.16 0.36 
Rail <150m (dummy) 0.09 0.29 
River <150m (dummy) 0.03 0.17 
Building status in process (dummy) 0.02 0.16 
Construction < 1900 0.01 0.12 
Renovation ≤ 1971 dummy b 0.05 0.22 
Renovation 1971-1980 (dummy) b 0.03 0.16 
Renovation 1981-1990 (dummy) b 0.73 0.44 
Renovation 1991-2000 (dummy) b 0.09 0.28 
Renovation ≥2001 (dummy) b 0.10 0.03 
Instrument   
Population 1830 per km2 1555.10 3313.88 
a We have data on parking spaces for about 30 percent of the observations. 
b We have information on construction year and year of last renovation and report the 
most recent year. When there is no information about construction and renovation year 
we impute the average (1986). 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of the second stage variables 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
Employment (number of workers) 24.41 84.55 
Manufacturing 0.12 0.32 
Transport 0.06 0.23 
Wholesale 0.17 0.38 
Retail 0.14 0.35 
Hotel, Catering & Recreation 0.03 0.17 
Business Services 0.31 0.46 
Consumer and Other Services 0.10 0.30 
Government 0.01 0.10 
Education 0.01 0.09 
Healthcare 0.05 0.21 
Other 0.01 0.11 
 
Figure A1: Map of agglomeration levels in Zuid-Holland 
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Appendix B. Semiparametric estimation procedure 
Table B1: Semi parametric estimation procedure of the first stage 
STEP 1 
 Let  be a matrix consisting of all independent variables and instruments and  a vector of all 
values of logJKKLM	>PJFMB. Let  be a matrix consisting of all municipality and year 
dummies. 
Linear part We regress the log of agglomeration and all municipality and year dummies  on independent 
variables (building size, controls) and instruments (population density 1830) nonparametrically 
(using local linear methods), where S 
 1, … , I 0 H. We generate residuals ;    g ! and 
     !, DS (see also Bontemps et al., 2008). Perform OLS on these residuals: ; 

  0 . Under regularity conditions, this procedure yields a √B-consistent and asymptotically 
normal estimator for  (Robinson, 1988). 
Nonlinear part Let      ̂. We regress this residual on A nonparametrically:  
  ! 0 . The vector  
consists of first stage errors: f 
     ! (Blundell and Powell, 2003). 
STEP 2 
 Let  be a matrix consisting of all independent variables: log agglomeration, size, and other 
controls. R is a vector consisting of the rents. We want to estimate: R 
 / ! 0   0 	 ! 0
. We assume that 	 ! 
 ∑   and  
 1, … ,5. 
Linear part We regress the rent R, all location dummies  and all orders of  on  nonparametrically. We 
generate residuals R  R  R B!,      !, DS, and     f !, D. Then, OLS is 
performed on these residuals: R 
   0 ∑  0 I. 
Nonlinear part Let I  R   f  	 !, where 	 ! 
 ∑ f  We regress this residual on  nonparametrically: 
I 
 $ ! 0 . 
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Appendix C. Other results 
 
Table C1: Second stage estimates of interactions workforce size and sectoral dummies 
 Size in m2   
Office 
Size in m2  
Shop 
Size in m2  
Industrial Building 
Empl*Manufacturing 1.33 (0.36) ***    0.22 (0.14)  
Empl*Transport -1.17 (1.07)     0.06 (0.55)  
Empl*Wholesale 1.12 (0.45) ** 0.06 (0.65)  0.60 (0.22) *** 
Empl*Retail 0.34 (0.42)  0.27 (0.68)  0.77 (0.47)  
Empl*Hotel & Recreation 1.48 (1.09)  -1.76 (2.21)     
Empl*Business Services 1.87 (0.36) *** -0.61 (0.52)  0.23 (0.20)  
Empl*Other Services 0.96 (0.40) ** -0.28 (0.40)  0.46 (0.34)  
Empl*Government 2.79 (2.39)        
Empl*Education -0.20 (2.08)        
Empl*Healthcare 1.76 (1.52)     0.38 (0.47)  
Empl*Other 6.29 (3.06) **       
Sectoral dummies (10) Yes Yes Yes 
          
Number of observations 2431 1787 2255 
R-squared 0.1672 0.0644 0.0662 
NOTES: See Table 2. Employment is in logs 
 
Table C2: Second stage estimates for agglomeration and size under exclusion of extreme valued observations 
 
Agglomeration 
Size in m2   
Office 
Size in m2  
Shop 
Size in m2  
Industrial Building 
Employment (log) 76.19 (31.51) ** 1.08 (0.17) *** -0.57 (0.2) *** 0.27 (0.06) *** 
Transport 71.74 (164.22)  3.07 (0.93) ***    0.61 (0.29) ** 
Wholesale -139.39 (113.60)  0.68 (0.49)  -4.72 (0.75) *** 0.50 (0.20) ** 
Retail 186.17 (111.10) * -0.04 (0.52)  2.18 (0.77) *** -1.46 (0.22) *** 
Hotel & Recreation -98.67 (192.52)  0.26 (1.07)  -0.11 (1.49)     
Business Services 956.45 (110.87) *** 5.44 (0.50) *** -3.97 (0.72) *** -1.29 (0.20) *** 
Other Services 591.81 (143.52) *** 2.38 (0.64) ***    -2.00 (0.23) *** 
Government 605.05 (680.12)  12.88 (2.11) ***       
Education 1099.1 (240.84) *** 3.41 (1.69) **       
Healthcare 758.74 (219.36) *** 6.52 (1.00) ***    -0.52 (0.60)  
Other 419.98 (286.84)  3.19 (1.27) **       
Constant 2242.43 (120.85) *** 114.72 (0.56) *** 119.51 (0.87) *** 43.16 (0.23) *** 
             
Number of observations 2431 2431 1787 2255 
R-squared 0.1039 0.1735 0.1442 0.1032 
NOTES: See Table 2. 
 
Table C3: WTP for agglomeration employing different values of <.     
 Nonparametric regression   
 < 
 0.5 < 
 1 < 
 2.5 < 
 5 < 
 10 
 Mean Pref. CoV Mean Pref. CoV Mean. Pref. CoV Mean. Pref. CoV Mean. Pref. CoV 
Agglomeration 3033.7 0.71 2765.62 0.81 3159.95 0.69 3493.16 0.63 3053.79 0.82 
 
        
Number of observations 3595 3595 3595 3595 3595 
NOTE: We report the WTP for a standard deviation increase from the mean: 2fhiij@b\.c," 
 2fhiij@b\.c, log 36714.76! 
log  22171.86!!, 2fhiij@b^.c," 
 2fhiij@b^.c, log 32711.21!  log  17615.62!!, 2 hiij@bc," 
 2fhiij@bc, log 24645.18! 
log  12035.95!!, 2fhiij@b]\," 
 2fhiij@b]\, log 17850.18!  log  8472.62!!. 
 
